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Abstract
We characterize sufficient conditions for full and decentralized disclosure of hard information
in organizations with asymmetrically informed and self interested agents with quadratic loss
functions. Incentive conflicts arise because agents have different (and possibly interdependent)
ideal actions and different incentives to coordinate with each others. A fully revealing sequential
equilibrium exists in the disclosure game if each player’s ideal action is monotonic in types and
types are independently distributed, but may fail to exist with non-monotonic ideal actions
or correlated types. When biases between players’ ideal actions are constant across states,
complete information is the Pareto dominant information structure. In that case, there is a
fully revealing sequential equilibrium in which informational incentive constraints are satisfied
ex-post, so it exists for all possible prior beliefs, even when players’ types are correlated. This
existence result applies whether information disclosure is private or public, and is extended to
partial certifiability of information.
Keywords: Certifiable types, coordination, information disclosure, multi-divisional organiza-
tions.
JEL Classification: C72; D82.
∗We thank Yann Bramoulle´, Rachel Kranton, Laurent Lamy, Eduardo Perez, and seminar participants at EUI
Florence, SFB-TR15 Seminar in Berlin, Stony Brook Conference on Game Theory 2011, and Games Toulouse 2011.
The second author thanks the “Agence National de la Recherche” (ANR) for financial support.
†E´cole Polytechnique — CNRS. E-mail : jeanne.hagenbach@polytechnique.edu
‡Paris School of Economics — CNRS. E-mail : koessler@pse.ens.fr
1
1 Introduction
We consider organizations whose members want to coordinate the actions they take in a decen-
tralized way, but disagree on the ideal decision to coordinate on. Every agent’s ideal decision is
assumed to potentially depend on the private information that every other agent has, about the
environment of the group for instance. In such contexts, information revelation within the organi-
zation entails a strategic aspect as agents may try to influence others’ choices by misrepresenting
what they know. This paper focuses on the internal communication phase preceding the one in
which payoff-relevant decisions are made. We consider costless disclosure of hard (or certifiable) in-
formation and investigate players’ incentives to reveal completely and voluntarily their information
to others.
One example of such an organization is a national association made up of several regional
divisions, each taking operating decisions separately. If these decisions are local investments in
public facilities for instance, some coordination may be needed to create coherence at the national
level. Similarly, in a multidivisional corporation, if each division chooses a kind of product to be
locally launched, coordination may be necessary to keep some harmony under a brand name. In
each case however, local particularities can be at the origin of disagreements between divisions
about the ideal action to coordinate on. At the same time, each division is likely to have some
private information which partly describes the overall context in which the whole organization
evolves, and therefore affects the agents’ ideal actions. The regional state of road safety or the
local taste of the customer base give part of the national picture and are examples of such private
pieces of information. In this paper, divisions have the opportunity to communicate this private
information to each other before acting. We examine the disclosure phase in which players have
the option to certify precisely their information, but may want to conceal it or use incomplete and
biased statements to influence other players’ decisions in their preferred direction.
We use a class of coordination games of asymmetric information to represent the multidivisional
organizations described above. This class of games is the object of a recent literature in the
economics of networks and organizations (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2002, Angeletos and Pavan, 2007,
Calvo´-Armengol and Mart´ı, 2007, Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek, 2008, Hagenbach and Koessler,
2010, Calvo-Armengol, De Mart´ı, and Prat, 2011)1, and we depart from existing works in that we
comprehend internal communication as strategic disclosure of free but verifiable messages. Each
member of our organization has two types of motives, represented by quadratic cost functions
trading-off between (i) the adaptation of his decision to an idiosyncratic value or “ideal action”
that may depend on his but also on others’ private information, and (ii) the coordination of his
decision with the others’ ones. In such situations, we ask whether it is possible to have full disclosure
of information despite the conflict of interests faced by agents regarding their ideal actions.
We first provide sufficient conditions on general Bayesian games for the existence of a fully
revealing sequential equilibrium in the disclosure game preceding the action stage. Next, we apply
this result to organizations with independent types and ideal actions which are monotone with
every private information. For example, when every player’s ideal action only depends on his
private information, monotonicity is always satisfied. Under the additional assumption that the
difference between any pair of players’ ideal actions is given by a constant bias across states, full
1See the next section for a short review of this literature and the differences with our approach.
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disclosure induces a Pareto dominant information structure. In that case, we show that informa-
tional incentive constraints are also satisfied ex-post, so a fully revealing equilibrium exists for all
possible prior beliefs, in particular when players’ types are correlated. This existence result applies
whether information disclosure is private or public, and is finally extended to partial certifiability
of information.
The next section discusses our contribution to the literature on disclosure games and to the
literature on organizational economics. Section 3 presents the model and a general preliminary
result on the existence of a fully revealing sequential equilibrium in general Bayesian games. Full
information disclosure in organizations with independent types is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5
extends our existence result to ex-post incentive compatibility, private disclosure and partial certi-
fiability in the special case of constant biases between players’ ideal actions. Section 6 concludes.
Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Strategic Information Revelation
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) consider seller-buyer relationships in which the seller is
privately informed about the quality of the product and has an interest in appearing of better
quality to the buyer. They show that if it is costless to provide hard evidence about minimal
levels of product quality, then there is a unique sequential equilibrium outcome, in which the
buyer completely learns product information from the seller.2 The proof of this result relies on a
straightforward unravelling argument. Uniqueness follows from the fact that if multiple types of
the seller pool together, then the highest quality type has an incentive to deviate and disclose his
type. Existence is obtained by considering “sceptical” beliefs for the buyer: any partial disclosure
of quality is interpreted as coming from the lowest possible quality type of the firm.
Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990) generalize this unravelling result to a class
of n-person games (with quadratic utility functions when n > 2) in which players are privately and
independently informed, assuming that equilibrium payoffs are unique and monotone in beliefs.
When equilibrium payoffs are monotone in beliefs, a fully revealing equilibrium can be constructed
as in Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) with sceptical beliefs putting probability one on the
lowest or the highest possible type of each sender. A typical example is a linear Cournot game
with homogeneous goods and privately known marginal costs, in which each firm’s equilibrium
payoff decreases when other firms’ beliefs about the level of its cost increase. A sceptical belief
is therefore simply to put probability one on the highest possible marginal cost compatible with
a firm’s report. Van Zandt and Vives (2007) prove the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium
in a class of Bayesian games with strategic complementarities, without assuming quadratic payoff
functions, but assuming as in Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) that types are independently distributed
and that each player’s utility function is monotone in the actions of the other players.
2This result does not always apply when products cannot be ordered in terms of quality, i.e., if different consumer
types have different tastes for product characteristics (see, e.g., Anderson and Renault, 2006, Johnson and Myatt,
2006, Koessler and Renault, 2011, and Sun, 2011) or if there is competition between several sellers (see, e.g., Board,
2009).
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The assumption of monotone payoffs with respect to others’ actions and beliefs is not satisfied
in strategic situations in which players’ preference over others’ actions depend on the state of the
world. For example, in the class of coordination games we are studying, when a player’s ideal action
is relatively high (low, respectively) he prefers others’ actions to increase (decrease, respectively).
Seidmann and Winter (1997), Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007) and Mathis (2008) have studied
disclosure in games with such state-dependent preferences over others’ actions. As in Grossman
(1981) and Milgrom (1981) they consider sender-receiver games with a single informed player (the
sender) and a single decisionmaker (the receiver). A simple application of their result on the
existence of a fully revealing equilibrium is the class of games studied by Crawford and Sobel
(1982) where preferences are single-peaked and players’ ideal actions are increasing in the sender’s
type. Interestingly, contrary to the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982), their model also allow
for the bias between the sender and the receiver to change sign.3 In that situation, as it is also the
case in our model, sceptical beliefs off the equilibrium path are more sophisticated because they
do not necessarily put probability one on the highest or lowest possible type compatible with a
sender’s report. The proof of the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium in such a situation relies
on the existence of a “worst-case type” for every possible subset of types of the sender (i.e., a type
that no type in that subset wants to imitate) without necessarily characterizing explicitly what this
worst-case type is.
Our first proposition, applied to coordination games assuming independent types, uses a gen-
eralization of the argument of Seidmann and Winter (1997) to prove that a “worst-case type”
always exists. It is based on our general result (Lemma 1) using the same “no reciprocal imitation”
condition as Seidmann and Winter,4 and an additional condition that we call “partially transitive
imitation”. This second condition is not required in Seidmann and Winter where the sender’s pref-
erence over the receiver’s belief is singled-peaked, an assumption that may not be satisfied in our
model when there are more than two players. The proof of our second proposition, assuming con-
stant biases, is more constructive and a worst-case type can be explicitly characterized as a function
of the sender’s identity, the profile of players’ biases, and the degrees of strategic complementari-
ties between players’ actions. This allows to easily relax the assumption that every single type is
certifiable, and also allows to show that informational incentive constraints are valid ex-post, once
players have learned others’ types. Hence, a fully revealing equilibrium exists whatever players’
beliefs, even when players’ types are correlated. We also extend this result to private information
revelation, which has not been considered in Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) and Van Zandt and
Vives (2007).5
2.2 Communication in Organizations
Our class of coordination games with incomplete information has received much interest in the
economic literature on organizations, but only recently assuming a conflict of interests between
agents regarding their ideal actions. When players agree on the state-contingent profile of decisions,
3This extension has also been analyzed recently under cheap talk in Gordon (2010).
4They call it “single crossing” but it is weaker than the usual definition.
5Whether communication is private or public can make a difference on the set of possible equilibrium outcomes
and on the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium, as shown in Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and Goltsman and
Pavlov (2011) in a cheap talk framework, and in Koessler (2008) in an information disclosure framework.
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communication of dispersed private information is trivial and the questions raised emerge from
physical restrictions on the communication rather than from strategic hindrances.
We consider quadratic payoff functions as in Morris and Shin (2002, 2007) and Cornand and
Heinemann (2008) except that they assume that all the agents are symmetric: they have homoge-
nous coordination motives and they want to adapt their individual decision to the same common
state. Every player initially gets a private imperfect signal about that state as well as a public
one. Their focus is on the trade-off between the relative precision of private signals and the com-
mon understanding provided by public ones, which matters for coordination. Angeletos and Pavan
(2007) propose a more general framework which enables to link the substituability or complemen-
tarity of player’s actions to the sensibility of their equilibrium decisions to either private or public
signals. In the same coordination games, Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) and Myatt and Wallace
(2011) have recently endogenized the acquisition of information about the common state to match.
The publicity of some signals therefore results from the agents’ information search and depends on
how complementary agents’ actions are. Information about the common state is also dispersed in
Calvo´-Armengol and Mart´ı (2007, 2009) but communication is restrained by the network in which
the agents are embedded, which shapes equilibrium decisions. On the contrary, we assume there
are no physical restrictions on who can speak to whom and let every agent communicate his private
information with all the other ones.
When players’s goals regarding ideal actions are not aligned, we ask whether it is yet possible
to have voluntary revelation of information. Such a question has already been addressed in Alonso
et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) who consider a cheap-talk communication stage preceding the
decision stage. In their organizational context, each of the two divisions wants to adapt his decision
to his private information only, and to the decision of the other. The need for coordination clearly
improves direct communication between the two divisions, which is an effect present in Hagenbach
and Koessler (2010) too. In the latter work, communication is also cheap-talk and heterogeneous
players play a coordination game of incomplete information similar to the one considered here.
However, the form of ideal actions is a particular case of the one considered in the present work, as
it is given by the sum of binary private signals and a constant positive or negative bias. A full char-
acterization of how the biases in the population shapes the communication occurring in equilibrium
is provided. A closely related paper is Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Squintani (2011) who consider sim-
ilar form for ideal actions but analyze cheap-talk communication about possibly correlated types,
abstracting away from coordination motives.
Calvo-Armengol et al. (2011) analyze a setting where each player wants to adapt to a private
state and to others’ actions, with different intensities of interdependence of actions for different
pairs of players. In their work, strategic choices do not concern messages sent, but formation of
costly communication links. From the communication network formed, influences of players’ private
information on equilibrium actions are deduced for various patterns of interaction between actions.
We also allow for such an heterogeneity in the weights players put on the need to coordinate with
various agents, and show that these parameters can have an impact on certification requirements
for full revelation to occur.
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3 Model and Preliminary Result
3.1 Disclosure Game
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a finite set of players. Each player i is privately informed about his type
si ∈ Si, where Si is a finite set {s1i , s2i . . .} whose elements are completely ordered as s1i < s2i < · · · .
Let q ∈ ∆(S) be the strictly positive prior probability distribution over the set of type profiles S ≡∏
i Si. After being informed about his own type each player i chooses an action ai ∈ Ai, and gets a
payoff ui(a; s), where a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A ≡
∏
iAi is the action profile and s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S is
the type profile. We assume that for every s ∈ S, the (complete information) strategic form game
〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui(·, s))i∈N 〉 has a unique Nash equilibrium, denoted by (a∗i (s))i∈N ∈ A.6
Before the Bayesian game 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , q, (ui)i∈N 〉 described below is played, but after
each player has learnt his type, a (simultaneous) disclosure stage is introduced in which players
can publicly and costlessly provide hard evidence about their types to the others. More precisely,
every player i sends a message mi ∈ Mi(si) to every other player, Mi(si) denoting the (finite and
nonempty) set of messages available to player i when his type is si.
7 Let Mi =
⋃
si∈SiMi(si) be the
set of all possible messages of player i. A message mi ∈Mi sent by player i provides hard evidence,
or “certifies”, to the receivers that player i’s type is in M−1i (mi). For simplicity we assume that
players always have the option to fully certify their type, meaning that for every player i and every
of his type si there exists a message msi ∈ Mi(si) that only type si can send: M−1i (msi) = {si}.
That is, every player i can, whatever his type si, send a message certifying the singleton {si}. This
assumption may be relaxed in special cases (see Section 5.4).
3.2 A General Sufficient Condition for Full Disclosure
In this section we provide general sufficient conditions for the existence of a fully revealing sequential
equilibrium (i.e., a sequential equilibrium in which, along the equilibrium path, every player always
learns the type profile before choosing his action) in the class of disclosure games described above.
These fully revealing equilibria are constructed with disclosure strategies such that every player
always fully certifies his type; that is, every player i, whatever his type si ∈ Si, send a message
msi ∈ Mi(si) such that M−1i (msi) = {si}. For every player i and message mi ∈ Mi off the
equilibrium path, we then consider beliefs for the other players about player i’s type that put
probability one on a single feasible type in M−1i (mi). Said differently, when players other than i
observe a message sent by player i certifying that player i’s type is in a subset S′i of Si, they all
believe that player i is of one type in S′i with probability one.
Assuming that the beliefs (along and off the equilibrium path) are common to all players other
than i (because messages are sent publicly) and only depend on player i’s message (in particular,
they do not depend on m−i and on the receivers’ types), it is easy to check that strong belief
consistency in the sense of Kreps and Wilson (1982) is satisfied.8 Sequential rationality in the
6When uniqueness is not satisfied any selection among the set of Nash equilibria can be done. The set of strategies
could also be extended to mixed strategies if required.
7In cheap talk games, note that the sets Mi(si) do not depend on si.
8Formally, to guarantee that every player j 6= i assigns probability one to a single type ti ∈ M−1i (mi) of player i
for a message mi off the equilibrium path from player i, it suffices to consider a perturbed and completely mixed
strategy for player i such that type ti sends message mi with probability ε and all other types in M
−1
i (mi) send
6
disclosure and action stages is defined as usual.
With such beliefs after the disclosure stage, every message mi ∈ M(si) of player i leads to
player i being considered as a type in M−1i (mi), say ti, by all the other players, who then take
equilibrium actions a∗−i(ti, s−i). For two types si and ti of player i we say that type si wants
to imitate type ti if player i of type si is strictly better off when all the other players play the
equilibrium actions (under complete information) as if they all believed that player i’s type were
ti instead of si:
Definition 1 A type si wants to imitate a type ti if we have:
Es−i|si
[
ui(a
∗
i (si, s−i), a
∗
−i(si, s−i); si, s−i)
]
< Es−i|si
[
ui(BRi(a
∗
−i(ti, s−i); si, s−i), a
∗
−i(ti, s−i); si, s−i)
]
.
Note that this definition of informational incentive compatibility is more complicated than
the usual one used in mechanism design or sender-receiver games. Indeed, our definition takes into
account, as in the definition of a communication equilibrium (Myerson, 1982, Forges, 1986), the best
response of player i of type si to other players’ (incorrect) beliefs ti denoted BRi(a
∗
−i(ti, s−i); si, s−i).
For a player i and every of his available messages mi, we construct a fully revealing equilibrium
using beliefs after the disclosure game that put probability one on a type in M−1i (mi) called the
worst-case type and defined as follows:
Definition 2 For every message mi ∈ Mi from player i, a worst-case type for the set M−1i (mi),
denoted by wcti(mi) ∈ M−1i (mi), is a type in M−1i (mi) that no other type in M−1i (mi) wants to
imitate. That is, a worst-case type wcti(mi) for M
−1
i (mi) is such that, for all si ∈M−1i (mi),
Es−i|si
[
ui(a
∗
i (si, s−i), a
∗
−i(si, s−i); si, s−i)
] ≥
Es−i|si
[
ui(BRi(a
∗
−i(wct
i(mi), s−i); si, s−i), a∗−i(wct
i(mi), s−i); si, s−i)
]
.
If it is possible to find a worst-case type for every subset of types of every player i, then no
player i of any type si ∈ Si has an interest in deviating from fully certifying his type (i.e., sending a
message msi ∈Mi(si) such that M−1i (msi) = {si}) to sending any message mi ∈Mi(si).9 We will
show that under the two following conditions, for any player i and any subset of his types S′i ⊆ Si,
there cannot be a “cycle of imitations” in S′i. This means that for any S
′
i ⊆ Si there is a type in S′i
that no other type in S′i wants to imitate. Hence, for any message certifying that player i’s type is
in S′i, the type that no other type wants to imitate is a worst-case type for player i in S
′
i.
10
Condition 1 (No Reciprocal Imitation) A Bayesian game satisfies No Reciprocal Imitation
(NRI) if for every player i and every pair of his types si and s
′
i, we have: If type si wants to imitate
type s′i then type s
′
i does not want to imitate type si.
mi with probability ε
2, with ε > 0 and ε → 0. This construction works even with correlated types as long as every
profile of types has a strictly positive prior probability.
9The existence of worst-case types is sufficient for the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium, but may not be
necessary; simple examples can be constructed where there is no worst-case type but non-degenerated beliefs off the
equilibrium path can sustain full information disclosure.
10Since we have made no assumption on exactly which subsets of types S′i a player i can certify, we show the
existence of a worst-case type for every subset of his types S′i.
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Condition 2 (Partially Transitive Imitation) A Bayesian game satisfies Partially Transitive
Imitation (PTI) if for every player i with at least three possible types and for every triple of his
types such that s′i < si, s
′′
i or s
′
i > si, s
′′
i we have: If (i) type si wants to imitate type s
′
i and (ii)
type s′i wants to imitate type s
′′
i , then (iii) type si wants to imitate type s
′′
i .
Under Condition PTI any cycle of imitations with strictly more than two types includes a
smaller cycle. Indeed, consider a cycle of imitations for player i containing at least three types
such that s′i is the smallest type in this cycle. Let si > s
′
i be a type that wants to imitate s
′
i in
the cycle, and let s′′i > s
′
i be a type that s
′
i wants to imitate in the cycle. By PTI, si also wants to
imitate s′′i , so a smaller cycle is included in the previous one. By recurrence, if a cycle exists then
it includes a cycle with only two types. It follows from Condition NRI that no cycle exists at all,
so a worst-case type always exists. This proves the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Assume that conditions NRI and PTI are satisfied. Then, for every player i, every
(non-empty) subset of types S′i ⊆ Si has a worst-case type. Hence, a fully revealing sequential
equilibrium exists.
In most existing models of strategic information disclosure, condition NRI alone is sufficient for
the existence of a worst-case type (see, for example, Proposition 3.1 in Giovannoni and Seidmann,
2007) because it is assumed that the sender’s expected payoff is single-peaked with respect to the
receiver’s belief about the sender’s type.11 In our class of coordination games below, it can be
shown that if there are only two players, then each player’s expected payoff is single-peaked with
respect to the other player’s belief, which fails to be true with three players or more.
3.3 A Class of Coordination Games
From now on we assume that when the type profile is s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S, player i’s payoff function
is given by
ui(a1, ..., an; s) = −αii(ai − θi(s))2 −
∑
j 6=i
αij(ai − aj)2, (1)
where αij > 0 for every i, j ∈ N . This utility function includes as particular cases most of the
utility functions used in the models with strategic complementarities discussed in Section 2.2. In
particular, it allows heterogeneous coordination motives (αij could be different from αkl for all pairs
of players (i, j) and (k, l)) and, more importantly, ideal actions θi(s) could differ across players and
depend on all players’ types. Normalizing players’ utility functions we can assume without loss of
generality that αij ∈ (0, 1) and
∑
j∈N αij = 1. The first component of agent i’s utility function is a
quadratic loss increasing in the distance between his action ai and his ideal action θi(s) ∈ R.12 The
second component is a miscoordination quadratic loss which increases in the distance between i’s
action and other agents’ actions. The constant αij ∈ (0, 1) weights agent i’s coordination motives
11In that case, we have: if si wants to imitate s
′
i, then si also wants to imitate all the types s
′′
i in between si and
s′i, that is, all the types s
′′
i such that si < s
′′
i < s
′
i or s
′
i < s
′′
i < si. From this observation, we can also deduce that
any cycle of imitation involving at least three types must contain a smaller cycle. As before, the NRI assumption
can then be used to conclude that no cycle exists at all.
12Notice that there is no loss of generality assuming that θi(s) is deterministic. If uncertainty is not fully resolved
by conditioning on the type profile it suffices to replace every random ideal action by its expected value conditionally
on s.
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with respect to j’s action. Clearly, each player i’s utility is not monotonic in others’ actions: his
utility is increasing with player j’s action aj if ai > aj , and it is decreasing with aj if ai < aj .
The differences of the θi(s) across agents reflect agents’ conflict of interests with respect to
their ideal actions. If all θi(s) were equal for every type profile s, there would be no informational
incentive problem and full information disclosure would therefore be trivially possible.
We make the following assumption throughout the paper.13
Assumption 1 For every i, j ∈ N and s−j ∈ S−j , θi(sj , s−j) is weakly increasing in sj .
Hence, a higher type for player j induces a higher ideal action for every player. Notice that
with private values (i.e., θi(s) = θi(si)) this assumption is automatically satisfied. This assumption
is made in most sender-receiver games studied in the literature (e.g., Crawford and Sobel, 1982,
Seidmann and Winter, 1997), where the ideal actions of the sender and the receiver are assumed to
be increasing in the sender’s type. Note that it does not prevent the sign of the difference between
two players’ ideal actions to change with the profile of types.
3.4 Complete Information Equilibrium
We characterize below players’ best responses and equilibrium actions under complete information,
i.e., when the profile of types s ∈ S is commonly known. The utility of player i can be rewritten
as (minus a constant):
ui(a1, ..., an; s) = ai
[
2αii θi(s) + 2
∑
j 6=i
αij aj − ai
]−∑
j 6=i
αij (aj)
2. (2)
Player i’s best response to a−i is given by
BRi(a−i; s) = αii θi(s) +
∑
j 6=i
αij aj . (3)
Notice that player i’s utility when he plays a best response is given by:
ui(a1, ..., an; s) = (ai)
2 −
∑
j 6=i
αij (aj)
2, if ai = BRi(a−i; s). (4)
The system of equations formed by players’ best responses can be written as:
1 −α12 · · · −α1n
−α21 . . . . . .
...
... −αij . . .
...
−αn1 · · · · · · 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A

a1
...
...
an
 =

α11θ1(s)
...
...
αnnθn(s)
 .
13Example 2 in the next section shows that without this assumption a fully revealing equilibrium may fail to exist
even when types are independently distributed.
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Denoting B ≡ (βij)ij ≡ A−1, every player’s equilibrium action under complete information is given
by the following linear combination of all the players’ ideal actions:
a∗i (s) =
∑
j∈N
γij θj(s), (5)
where γij ≡ βij αjj ∈ (0, 1) for every i, j ∈ N , and
∑
j∈N γij = 1.
14 Notice that when coordination
motives are symmetric (i.e., αij = α for every i 6= j) we have γij = α1+α , i 6= j, and γii = 1−(n−2)α1+α .
The following simple example uses the equilibrium characterization above to illustrate how to
identify a worst-case type when there are only two possible type profiles.
Example 1 Assume that n = 2, αij = 1/2 for every i, j ∈ {1, 2}, S1 = {s, s}, and player 2 has no
private information (S2 is a singleton). Player i’s equilibrium action under complete information is
a∗i (s1) =
2θi(s1) + θj(s1)
3
.
With (θ1(s), θ2(s)) = (0, 1) and (θ1(s), θ2(s)) = (1, 2) we get (a
∗
1(s), a
∗
2(s)) = (
1
3 ,
2
3) and (a
∗
1(s), a
∗
2(s))
= (43 ,
5
3). Here, player 1 of type s wants to imitate player 1 of type s because a
∗
2(s) = 2/3 is closer
to his ideal action θ1(s) = 1 than a
∗
2(s) = 5/3. On the contrary, type s does not want to imitate
s because a∗2(s) = 5/3 is further away from his ideal action θ1(s) = 0 than a∗2(s) = 2/3. Hence, s
is a worst-case type of player 1 for {s, s}. Finally, note that the way types want to imitate each
other in this example can be deduced simply from the fact that player 1 has a lower ideal action
than player 2 whatever his type.
4 Full Disclosure with Independent Types
Our first result directly applies Lemma 1 to our coordination game in the case in which players’
types are independently distributed:
Proposition 1 If players’ types are independently distributed, then conditions NRI and PTI are
satisfied, so a fully revealing sequential equilibrium exists.
Proof. See the appendix where we show that if players’ types are independently distributed,
then Conditions NRI and PTI are satisfied. Thus, by Lemma 1, a fully revealing sequential equi-
librium exists.
The example below shows that if the ideal actions are not monotonic in types (i.e., Assumption 1
fails), then a fully revealing equilibrium may not exist, even with only two players and one-side
incomplete information. The second 2-player example shows that a fully revealing equilibrium may
also fail to exist when players’ types are correlated.
14Each βij is indeed positive because the matrix B can be written as B = (Id−Ω)−1 =∑k≥0 Ωk, where all elements
of Ω are in the interval (0, 1) and the sum over each line of Ω is smaller than 1. When θi(s1, . . . , sn) = θ(s1, . . . , sn)
for every i ∈ N , every player’s equilibrium action is obviously a∗i (s) = θ(s); hence,
∑
j∈N γij = 1 ((γij)i,j only depend
on (αij)i,j , not on the form of players’ values (θi(·))i).
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Example 2 (Non-monotonic ideal actions) Consider n = 2 players, with symmetric weights
on the quadratic losses, αij = 1/2 for every i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Player 1 has two possible types, S1 = {s, s},
and player 2 has no private information. The ideal actions are given by θ1(s) = θ2(s) = 1 and
θ1(s) = θ2(s) = 0, so Assumption 1 is not satisfied because players’ ideal actions are not ordered in
the same way with respect to player 1’s type. If information is fully disclosed then the actions are
given by the complete information equilibrium actions a∗1(s) = a∗2(s) = 2/3, a∗1(s) = a∗2(s) = 1/3.
Intuitively, full disclosure is not feasible here because two types want to imitate each others (“no
reciprocal imitation” fails): type s would like to imitate type s (to increase player 2’s action towards
his ideal action θ1(s) = 1), and type s would like to imitate type s (to decrease player 2’s action
towards his ideal action θ1(s) = 0). To completely prove the non existence of a fully revealing
equilibrium, let µ ∈ [0, 1] be an arbitrary belief for player 2’s about type s1 = s of player 1 after
some message in M1(s)∩M1(s) 6= ∅ sent by player 1 off the equilibrium path. After such a message,
it is easy to show that players’ actions are given by
a1(s1) =
2− µ+ 3θ1(s1)
6
and a2 =
2− µ
3
.
Player 1 does not deviate from full disclosure if whatever his type s1 ∈ {s, s} we have:
u1(a
∗
1(s1), a
∗
2(s1); s1) ≥ u1(a1(s1), a2; s1),
i.e., −2/9 ≥ −1/18(1 + µ)2 and −2/9 ≥ −1/18(2 − µ)2. The first condition, for type s, implies
µ = 1, and the second, for type s, implies µ = 0, which is impossible. Hence, full disclosure is not
a sequential equilibrium.
Example 3 (Correlated types) Consider again n = 2 players, with αij = 1/2 for every i, j ∈
{1, 2}. Each player has two possible types, S1 = {s1, s1} and S2 = {s2, s2}, with the (correlated)
prior distribution q(s1, s2) = q(s1, s2) =
1−ε
2 and q(s1, s2) = q(s1, s2) =
ε
2 , where ε > 0 is small.
Assume that the ideal action of player 1 is always zero: θ1(s1, s2) = 0 for every (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2.
If information is fully disclosed then the actions are given by the complete information equilibrium
actions
a∗1(s1, s2) =
θ2(s1, s2)
3
and a∗2(s1, s2) =
2θ2(s1, s2)
3
.
Let θ2(s1, s2) = θ2(s1, s2) = 0, θ2(s1, s2) = −1 and θ2(s1, s2) = 1 so that Assumption 1 is satisfied,
but there is reciprocal imitation for ε small enough. To show that there is no fully revealing
equilibrium, consider a full disclosure strategy and let µ(s2) be player 2’s belief about type s1 for
a message in M1(s1) ∩M1(s1) 6= ∅ sent off the equilibrium path when player 2’s type is s2 ∈ S2.
After such a message, players’ actions are given by
a1(s1, s2) =
µ(s2)θ2(s1, s2) + (1− µ(s2))θ2(s1, s2)
3
,
and
a2(s2) =
2
(
µ(s2)θ2(s1, s2) + (1− µ(s2))θ2(s1, s2)
)
3
.
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We obtain
u1(a
∗
1(s1, s2), a
∗
2(s1, s2); s1, s2)− u1(a1(s1, s2), a2(s2); s1, s2)
=
(
µ(s2)θ2(s1, s2) + (1− µ(s2))θ2(s1, s2)
3
)2
−
(
θ2(s1, s2)
3
)2
The expected value of this difference is positive for player 1 whatever his type if
(1− ε)[(µ(s2))2 − 1] + ε(1− µ(s2))2 ≥ 0,
(1− ε)[(1− µ(s2))2 − 1] + ε(µ(s2))2 ≥ 0.
Belief consistency requires that µ(s2) ≥ 1− ε if and only if µ(s2) ≥ ε. Hence, the two inequalities
above cannot be satisfied simultaneously when ε is small enough, so a fully revealing sequential
equilibrium does not exist.
5 Full Disclosure with Constant Biases
While most models in the literature on strategic communication assume that types are indepen-
dently distributed (e.g., Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990, Van Zandt and Vives, 2007, Alonso et al.,
2008, Rantakari, 2008), other standard information structures involve correlation of types, for ex-
ample when players receive signals about a common parameter that are independently distributed
conditionally on this parameter (types are therefore unconditionally correlated). In this section
we extend the existence result of the previous section to any information structure with correlated
types, assuming that players’ ideal actions have a common value uncertainty component, and can
be written as
θi(s1, . . . , sn) = θ(s1, . . . , sn) + bi, for every i ∈ N, (6)
where bi is a constant “bias” parameter, and θ(s) is still assumed to be weakly increasing in s
(Assumption 1).15 Under this assumption, the equilibrium actions under complete information
take the form
a∗i (s) =
∑
j∈N
γijθ(s) +
∑
j∈N
γijbj = θ(s) +
∑
j∈N
γijbj ≡ θ(s) +Bi. (7)
5.1 Efficiency
The next proposition shows that when the biases between players’ ideal actions are constant across
states, full information disclosure is always desirable for all players in the sense that it induces the
best information structure in terms of equilibrium payoffs.
Proposition 2 With constant biases the equilibrium outcome under complete information ex-ante
Pareto dominates the equilibrium outcome under any information structure.
Proof. See the appendix.
15The constant bias assumption is common in models studying communication in organizations (see, e.g., Dessein,
2002).
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The following example shows that this proposition is not necessarily true when biases are not
constant.
Example 4 Consider a 2-player game with symmetric coordination motives (α12 = α21 = α) in
which player 1 has no private information, θ1(s) = 0 for every s ∈ S = S2, and E[θ2(s)] = 0. In
this example we show that player 1 is strictly better off not knowing player 2’s type when α is large
enough. Under complete information, equilibrium actions are given by:
aCI1 (s) =
αθ2(s)
1 + α
and aCI2 (s) =
θ2(s)
1 + α
,
so player 1’s utility under complete information is:
uCI1 (s) = −(1− α)
(
αθ2(s)
1 + α
)2
− α
(
(1− α)θ2(s)
1 + α
)2
= −(1− α)α
(1 + α)2
[θ2(s)]
2
Under incomplete information, equilibrium actions are given by:
aII1 (s) = 0 and a
II
2 (s) = (1− α)θ2(s),
so player 1’s utility under incomplete information is:
uII1 (s) = −α(1− α)2[θ2(s)]2.
Clearly, we have uII1 (s) > u
CI
1 (s) whenever θ2(s) 6= 0 when α is large enough.16
5.2 An Ex-Post Fully Revealing Equilibrium
To support full disclosure of information by every player i, we now explicitly find a worst-case type
ti ∈ S′i for every S′i ⊆ Si, such that, for all si ∈ S′i and s−i ∈ S−i we have:
ui(a
∗
i (si, s−i), a
∗
−i(si, s−i); si, s−i) ≥ ui(BRi(a∗−i(ti, s−i); si, s−i), a∗−i(ti, s−i); si, s−i).
For every player and every subset of his types, the worst-case type we identify depends on
the parameters of the game. Precisely, the profile of biases (b1, . . . , bn) and the weights (αij)i,j
determine, for every s, whether a player i’s equilibrium action a∗i (s) under complete information
(given by Equation (7)) is relatively higher or lower than the ones of other players j 6= i, a∗j (s).
In the case in which Xi ≡
∑
j 6=i αij(Bi − Bj) ≤ 0, a worst-case type for any message mi sent by
player i corresponds to the highest type si in the feasible subset of types M
−1
i (mi). The intuition,
similar to the one of Example 1,17 is that, when Xi ≤ 0, player i would like to appear of a lower
type than he is truly, while the reverse is not true. Therefore, players j 6= i believing the highest
type compatible with any message sent by player i ensures he has no interest from deviating from
full disclosure. On the contrary, in the case in which Xi ≡
∑
j 6=i αij(Bi − Bj) ≥ 0, a worst-case
16When α >
√
5−1
2
' 0.62.
17In Example 1 involving two agents only, the common value component is θ(s) = 0 and θ(s) = 1. Players’ biases
are given by b1 = 0 and b2 = 1. One can check easily that X1 ≤ 0.
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type for any message mi sent by player i corresponds to the lowest type si in the feasible subset of
types M−1i (mi). Constructing beliefs using such worst-case types, we show:
Proposition 3 With constant biases there exists a fully revealing sequential equilibrium in which
every player’s informational incentive constraints are satisfied ex-post, once he has learnt other
players’ types.
Proof. See the appendix.
We have identified a worst-case type for every player i and every subset of his types S′i no matter
what the types s−i of the other players are. Full disclosure of information by player i therefore can
occur in equilibrium even if he knows the type of others, implying that the equilibrium is robust to
the specification of players’ prior beliefs about others’ types. In particular, the existence of a fully
revealing equilibrium applies even under correlated types, contrary to Proposition 1.
Finally note that in the particular case of symmetric coordination motive (i.e., αij = α for
every i 6= j), Xi has the sign of bi −
∑
j 6=i bj/(n − 1).18 Hence, worst-case types for a player i
can be simply found by checking whether his bias is lower or higher than the average bias of the
other players b =
∑
j 6=i bj/(n− 1), that is, by examining the relative position of their ideal actions:
when his bias is lower than this average, players in N\{i} believe the highest type compatible with
player i’s report, and they believe the lowest type in the reverse case.
5.3 Private Disclosure
In the disclosure game that we have been considering, each player sends a public message about his
type, in the sense that player i sends the same message mi to every player j 6= i. In some situations,
it is however the case that announcements cannot be made publicly, and that a different message
could be sent by a player to every other one. In that case, a player i of type si can send a private
message mji ∈Mi(si) to every player j 6= i. Each player j 6= i then makes a private inference from
i’s private message.19
Informational incentives constraints for player i therefore require that he has no interest in
deviating from sending a message fully certifying his type to any of the players j 6= i. To support
full disclosure of information by a player i whatever his prior beliefs about others’ types, we consider
beliefs for every player j 6= i and message mji that assign probability one (i) on a single type
tji ∈ M−1i (mji ) of player i, and (ii) on the fact that each other player k (k 6= i, k 6= j) received a
message certifying tji (so that player j believes that player k has the same belief about i’s type as
j). Formally, for every j 6= i and for every Sji ⊆ Si, we explicitly find a (worst-case) type tji ∈ Sji ,
such that, for all si ∈ Sji and s−i ∈ S−i we have:
ui(a
∗
i (si, s−i), a
∗
−i(si, s−i); si, s−i) ≥ ui(BRi((a∗j (tji , s−i))j 6=i; si, s−i), (a∗j (tji , s−i))j 6=i; si, s−i).
18For symmetric coordination motive, we have Bi =
1
1+α
[
(1− (n− 2)α)bi + α∑k 6=i bk] and therefore Bi − Bj =
1
1+α
(1 − (n − 1)α)(bi − bj). Noting that α1+α (1 − (n − 1)α) > 0, we have that
∑
j 6=i α(Bi − Bj) has the sign of
(n− 1)bi −∑j 6=i bj .
19In particular, belief consistency of the sequential equilibrium does not prevent two players j and k receiving the
same message mji = m
k
i off the equilibrium path to put probability one on different types t
j
i and t
k
i both belonging
to M−1i (m
j
i ) = M
−1
i (m
k
i ).
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The construction of beliefs after any private message is similar to the one used in the previous
subsection for public messages. In the private disclosure game, when player j receives a private
message mji from player i and his equilibrium action under complete information is relatively high
compared to player i’s one (i.e., Xij = Bi −Bj ≤ 0), he believes that player i’s type is the highest
type compatible with i’s message and certified this type to all the other players. In the reverse
case (i.e., Xij ≥ 0), he believes the lowest type compatible with i’s message. Such a construction
of beliefs enables to show:
Proposition 4 With constant biases the existence of a fully revealing sequential equilibrium ex-
tends to private disclosure.
Proof. See the appendix.
Again, note that when coordination motives are symmetric (i.e., αij = α for every i 6= j), Xij
has the sign of bi − bj . Hence, worst-case types for a player i can be simply found by checking
whether his bias is lower or higher than each player j’s bias: when bj ≥ bi, player j 6= i believes the
highest type compatible with player i’s report, and he believes the lowest type in the reverse case.
5.4 Partial Certifiability
As shown in the proofs of Proposition 3 (public disclosure) and Proposition 4 (private disclosure), to
support full disclosure of information, the form of players’ beliefs off the equilibrium path depends
on the parameters of the game (the profile of biases and the weights on coordination motives), on
the player who deviates, and on the players who observe this deviation (which depends on whether
the disclosure game is public or private). Our explicit finding of worst-case types for every player i
as a function of the relative positions of player i’s equilibrium action under complete information
with respect to other players’ equilibrium actions (given by Xi ≡
∑
i 6=j αij(Bi − Bj) under public
disclosure and Xij ≡ Bi − Bj , j 6= i, under private disclosure) has interesting implications on
the certifiability requirements for full information disclosure. The next proposition shows how the
assumption of full certifiability can be relaxed for cases in which the messages available for every
type of every player have a special structure:
Proposition 5 (Fully disclosure with partial certifiability) In the public disclosure game,
if each player i such that Xi < 0 can certify, whatever his type si, that his type is at most si (i.e.,
there exists mi ∈ Mi(si) such that si = maxM−1i (mi)), and each player i such that Xi > 0 can
certify, whatever his type si, that his type is at least si (i.e., there exists mi ∈ Mi(si) such that
si = minM
−1
i (mi)), then there exists a fully revealing equilibrium.
In the private disclosure game, if each player i such that Xij ≤ 0 for all j 6= i can certify,
whatever his type si, that his type is at most si, each player i such that Xij ≥ 0 for all j 6= i can
certify, whatever his type si, that his type is at least si, and the other players can completely certify
their types, then there exits a fully revealing equilibrium.
Proof. See the appendix.
In the previous subsections, we proved that, with completely certifiable types, a fully revealing
equilibrium exists whatever the biases and the weights on coordination needs, both under public
15
and private communication. On the contrary, the example below shows that, when types can only
be partially certified, the possibility of full information disclosure depends on the communication
protocol and on parameters of the game. In particular, it illustrates Proposition 5 by presenting
a situation in which the certification possibilities lead to existence of a fully revealing equilibrium
under public communication but not under private communication.
Example 5 Consider a game with n = 3 players and symmetric coordination motives αij =
1
4 for
every i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i 6= j. Assume that only player 1 has private information s ∈ {s1, s2, s3} =
S1 = S with s
1 < s2 < s3. Let players’ biases satisfy b2 ≤ b1 ≤ b3 and b1 ≤ b2+b32 , and the messages
available to player 1 be:
M1(s
1) = {m1,m2,m3}, M1(s2) = {m2,m3}, M1(s3) = {m3}.
With such sets of available messages, each type s of player 1 can certify that he is at most type sx
by sending message mx. Players’ equilibrium actions under complete information are given by
ai(s) = θ(s) +
3bi +
∑
j 6=i bj
5
,
implying that a2(s) < a1(s) < a3(s) for every s.
By Proposition 5, b1 ≤ b2+b32 and the fact that player 1 can certify that he is at most any of
his actual type imply the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium under public communication.
Its construction relies on players 2 and 3 putting probability 1 on player 1 being of type sx when
they receive message mx, that is, believing the highest type in M−1(mx). For example, such beliefs
prevent player 1 of type s2 to send publicly the message m3 as he does not want to be considered
as the player of a higher type s3 by both the agents 2 and 3.
However, b2 ≤ b1 ≤ b3 and player 1 cannot fully certify all his types (in particular, he cannot fully
certify s2 and s3) which means Proposition 5 does not apply under private communication. Consider
the fully revealing disclosure strategy in the private disclosure game, where every type sx of player 1
sends message mx. When player 1’s type is s1 and player 1 deviates from sending m1 to sending m2
to player 2 (without deviating towards player 3 which is possible under private communication), his
best response is to choose action BR1(a
∗
2(s
2), a∗3(s1); s1) =
2(θ(s1)+b1)+a∗2(s
2)+a∗3(s
1)
4 =
3θ(s1)+θ(s2)
4 +
3b1+b2+b3
5 . This deviation is profitable if we have:
u1(a
∗(s1), a∗2(s
1), a∗3(s
1); s1) < u1(BR1(a
∗
2(s
2), a∗3(s
1); s1), a∗2(s
2), a∗3(s
1); s1).
After some simplifications, we get that player 1 deviates if:
b1 − b2 > 15(θ(s2)− θ(s1))
16
.
Hence, under this condition there is no fully revealing equilibrium in the private disclosure game.
The reason is that if player 2 believes that player 1 is of type sx when he gets a message mx, then
player 1 of type s2 for instance has an interest in sending message m3 instead of m2 to player 2
only as b2 ≤ b1.
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6 Conclusion
The present paper contributes to the two strands of literature presented in Section 2, namely
strategic information revelation and organizational economics, which have been recently connected
through the introduction of divergence of interests between privately informed members of orga-
nizations.20 In such cases, agents differ in the ideal decision they would like the group members
to coordinate on, and information revelation therefore entails a strategic aspect as players try to
influence the others’ actions by misrepresenting their private information. In this framework, we
raise the question of whether voluntary and complete revelation of information can occur in equi-
librium under the assumption that information is certifiable. We first provide sufficient conditions
for the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium in general Bayesian games. Precisely, we show
that a fully revealing sequential equilibrium exists in any incomplete information game exhibiting
the two following properties : (i) there is no reciprocal imitation between any pair of types of any
player, and (ii) for every player, imitations occurring for particular subsets of his types exhibit a
transitivity property.
Next, we apply this general result to organizations where each member’s motives are represented
by quadratic cost functions trading off between taking an action close to an idiosyncratic ideal
decision (function of all the private information), and taking it close to others’ actions. Contrary
to existing works examining strategic communication in a similar framework, we do not consider
cheap-talk but study the incentives of players to disclosure their information when they all have
the opportunity to fully certify their types. We show that a fully revealing sequential equilibrium
exists if each player’s ideal action is monotonic in types and types are independently distributed. We
provide examples showing that full disclosure mail fail to occur when actions are non-monotonic or
when types are correlated. With more structure on the ideal actions, namely assuming they are the
sum of a common uncertain component and an individual bias constant across states, we prove the
existence of a fully revealing equilibrium even when types are correlated, or when information can
only be revealed privately. The complete information structure then Pareto-dominates any other
information structure, which is wrong when the only assumption on ideal actions is monotonicity
with respect to types. In that case, one ambitious goal would be to identify the ex-ante optimal
information structure before asking whether it can emerge in equilibrium or not.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Condition 1 (NRI). We first show that, if players’s types are independently
distributed, then Condition 1 (No Reciprocal Imitation) holds. To do so, we consider two types of
player i, si and s
′
i with si > s
′
i, and show that the conditions that si wants to imitate s
′
i and s
′
i
wants to imitate si cannot hold both at the same time. Using Definition 1, si wants to imitate s
′
i
if and only if:
Es−i|siui[a
∗
i (si, s−i), a
∗
−i(si, s−i); si, s−i] < Es−i|siui[BRi(a
∗
−i(s
′
i, s−i); si, s−i), a
∗
−i(s
′
i, s−i); si, s−i].
20See, among others, Alonso et al. (2008), Rantakari (2008) or Hagenbach and Koessler (2010).
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To simplify the notations, let s = (si, s−i) and s′ = (s′i, s−i). Using Equation (4) to replace player i’s
utility when he plays a best response, we get:
Es−i|si
[
(a∗i (s))
2 −
∑
j 6=i
αij(a
∗
j (s))
2
]
< Es−i|si
[
(BRi(a
∗
j (s
′)); s)2 −
∑
j 6=i
αij(a
∗
j (s
′))2
]
⇔ Es−i|si
[(
a∗i (s)−BRi(a∗j (s′); s)
)(
a∗i (s) +BRi(a
∗
j (s
′); s)
)
−
∑
j 6=i
αij
(
a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′)
)(
a∗j (s) + a
∗
j (s
′)
)]
< 0.
Given that a∗i (s) = BRi(a
∗
i (s); s), we have a
∗
i (s) − BRi(a∗j (s′); s) =
∑
j 6=i αij(a
∗
j (s) − a∗j (s′)) and
obtain:
Es−i|si
[∑
j 6=i
αij
(
a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dj
(
a∗i (s) +BRi(a
∗
j (s
′); s)− a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aj
]
< 0. (8)
With the same reasoning, we get that s′i wants to imitate si if and only if:
−Es−i|s′i
[∑
j 6=i
αij
(
a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dj
(
a∗i (s
′) +BRi(a∗j (s); s
′)− a∗j (s′)− a∗j (s)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bj
]
< 0. (9)
Given that players’ types are independent, the probability distribution over the profiles s−i is the
same for player i knowing his type is si or s
′
i, and we write Es−i|si = Es−i|s′i = Es−i . Equation (8)
becomes Es−i [
∑
j 6=i αijDjAj ] < 0 and Equation (9) becomes Es−i [
∑
j 6=i αijDjBj ] > 0. From As-
sumption 1 (monotonicity of ideal actions), Equation (5) and the fact that γij > 0 for every i, j ∈ N ,
we have that every player j’s equilibrium action a∗j (s) is weakly increasing in si for every i, j ∈ N .
Since si > s
′
i, we deduce that Dj > 0 for every j 6= i and every s−i. Finally, we compare Aj to Bj :
Aj −Bj = a∗i (s)− a∗i (s′) +BRi(a∗j (s′); s)−BRi(a∗j (s); s′)
= αiiθi(s) +
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (s)− αiiθi(s′)−
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (s
′)
+αiiθi(s) +
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (s
′)− αiiθi(s′)−
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (s)
= 2αii(θi(s)− θi(s′)).
Since si > s
′
i, it follows from Assumption 1 that Aj > Bj for every j 6= i and every s−i. With
Dj > 0 and Aj > Bj , Equations (8) and (9) cannot hold at the same time. A similar reasoning
brings the same conclusion for the case in which si < s
′
i.
Proof of Proposition 1: Condition 2 (PTI). We next show that, if players’s types are independently
distributed, then Condition 2 (Partially Transitive Imitation) holds. To do so, we consider three
types of player i, si, s
′
i and s
′′
i such that s
′
i < si, s
′′
i , and show that when (i) si wants to imitate s
′
i
and (ii) s′i wants to imitate s
′′
i then (iii) si wants to imitate s
′′
i . Using the same reasoning as to get
Equation (8), we get that the statements of imitation (i), (ii) and (iii) are respectively equivalent
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to the following three conditions, where s = (si, s−i), s′ = (s′i, s−i) and s
′′ = (s′′i , s−i).
(i) Es−i|si
[∑
j 6=i
αij
(
a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′)
)(
a∗i (s) +BRi(a
∗
j (s
′); s)− a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C(i)
]
< 0;
(ii) Es−i|s′i
[∑
j 6=i
αij
(
a∗j (s
′)− a∗j (s′′)
)(
a∗i (s
′) +BRi(a∗j (s
′′); s′)− a∗j (s′)− a∗j (s′′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C(ii)
]
< 0;
(iii) Es−i|si
[∑
j 6=i
αij
(
a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′′)
)(
a∗i (s) +BRi(a
∗
j (s
′′); s)− a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C(iii)
]
< 0.
We show that C(iii) < C(ii) + C(i). We have:
C(iii)− C(ii)− C(i)
=
∑
j 6=i
αij
[(
a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′′)
)(
a∗i (s) +BRi(a
∗
j (s
′′); s)− a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′′)
)
−
(
a∗j (s
′)− a∗j (s′′)
)(
a∗i (s
′) +BRi(a∗j (s
′′); s′)− a∗j (s′)− a∗j (s′′)
)
−
(
a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′)
)(
a∗i (s) +BRi(a
∗
j (s
′); s)− a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′)
)]
=
∑
j 6=i
αij
[(
a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′′)
)(
αiiθi(s) +
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (s) + αiiθi(s) +
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (s
′′)− a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′′)
)
−
(
a∗j (s
′)− a∗j (s′′)
)(
αiiθi(s
′) +
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (s
′) + αiiθi(s′) +
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (s
′′)− a∗j (s′)− a∗j (s′′)
)
−
(
a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′)
)(
αiiθi(s) +
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (s) + αiiθi(s) +
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (s
′)− a∗j (s)− a∗j (s′)
)]
= 2αii
∑
j 6=i
αij
[(
θi(s)− θi(s′)
)(
a∗j (s
′)− a∗j (s′′)
)]
Since s′i < si, s
′′
i , it follows from Assumption 1 and from Equation (5) that C(iii) < C(ii) +
C(i) < 0 for every s−i. Given that players’ types are independent, the probability distribution over
the profiles s−i is the same for player i knowing his type is si, s′i or s
′′
i . Hence, the statements of
imitation (i) and (ii) imply statement (iii). A similar reasoning brings the same conclusion when
s′i > si, s
′′
i .
Proof of Proposition 2. Thanks to the linearity of players’ best reply we do not need to specify
explicitly the information structure and associated equilibrium actions to prove this result. For
any information structure it suffices to observe, using the same linear algebra as in Section 3.4,
that the associated equilibrium action profile, denoted by the random variable (a˜i)i∈N whose real-
izations depend on players’ signal profile, has the same ex-ante expected value as under complete
information:
E[a˜i] = E[θ(s)] +Bi, i ∈ N.
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The resulting ex-ante equilibrium payoff of player i is given by:
E
[− αii(a˜i − θ(s)− bi)2 −∑
j 6=i
αij(a˜i − a˜j)2
]
= −αiiV ar(a˜i − θ(s)− bi)− αii[E(a˜i − θ(s)− bi)]2 −
∑
j 6=i
αijV ar(a˜i − a˜j)−
∑
j 6=i
αij [E(a˜i − a˜j)]2
= −αiiV ar(a˜i − θ(s)− bi)−
∑
j 6=i
αijV ar(a˜i − a˜j)− αii[Bi − bi]2 −
∑
j 6=i
αij [Bi −Bj ]2.
Under complete information about s and constant biases we have a˜i− a˜j = a∗i (s)−a∗j (s) = Bi−Bj
and a˜i − θ(s)− bi = Bi − bi, so in that case the variances in the equation above are equal to zero.
It follows that every player is strictly better off ex-ante under complete information about s than
under incomplete information.
Proof of Proposition 3. When types are fully certifiable, the simplest way to support a fully
revealing equilibrium is to consider a disclosure strategy profile such that every player completely
certifies his type to all the other players whatever his type. Consider a deviation by player i from
a fully revealing disclosure strategy to a message mi ∈Mi(si) when his type is si. To prevent such
a deviation it suffices to show that we can always find a worst-case type ti ∈ M−1i (mi) that only
depends on the identity of player i and the message mi such that type si of player i does not want
to imitate type ti whatever the realization of other players’ types, s−i:
ui(a
∗
i (si, s−i), a
∗
−i(si, s−i); si, s−i) ≥ ui(BRi(a∗−i(ti, s−i); si, s−i), a∗−i(ti, s−i); si, s−i). (10)
Satisfying this no imitation condition for every s−i implies it is satisfied in expectation for player i
over the profile s−i whatever player i’s beliefs about others’ types.
To simplify the notations, let s = (si, s−i) and t = (ti, s−i). Using Equation (4) to replace
player i’s utility when he plays a best response, the previous inequality can be rewritten as:
(a∗i (s))
2 −∑j 6=i αij(a∗j (s))2 ≥ (BRi(a∗−i(t); s))2 −∑j 6=i αij(a∗j (t))2. (11)
The form of player i’s best response to the actions of the other players is given by Equation (3)
and we use Equation (7) for the case of constant biases to get:
BRi(a
∗
−i(t); s) = αii(θ(s) + bi) +
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (t) = αii(θ(s) + bi) +
∑
j 6=i
αij(θ(t) +Bj).
From the fact that Bi = αiibi +
∑
j 6=i αijBj ,
21 we get
BRi(a
∗
−i(t); s) = αiiθ(s) + (1− αii)θ(t) +Bi.
21From Equation (7), we know that a∗i (s) = θ(s)+Bi. From the expression of BRi(a
∗
−i(t); s) that we just calculated,
we deduce that Bi = αiibi +
∑
j 6=i αijBj since a
∗
i (s) = BRi(a
∗
−i(s); s).
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We now insert this expression into Inequality (11) and use the notations θ = θ(s) and τ = θ(t):
(θ +Bi)
2 −∑j 6=i αij(θ +Bj)2 ≥ (αiiθ + (1− αii)τ +Bi)2 −∑j 6=i αij(τ +Bj)2
⇔
[
(1− αii)(θ − τ)][θ + αiiθ + (1− αii)τ + 2Bi)
]
−∑j 6=i αij[(θ − τ)(θ + τ + 2Bj)] ≥ 0
⇔ (θ − τ)
[
(1− αii)(θ + αiiθ + (1− αii)τ + 2Bi)−
∑
j 6=i αij(θ + τ + 2Bj)
]
≥ 0
⇔ (θ − τ)
[
(1− αii)(θ + αiiθ + (1− αii)τ + 2Bi)− (1− αii)(θ + τ)−
∑
j 6=i αij2Bj
]
≥ 0
⇔ (θ − τ)
[
αii(1− αii)(θ − τ) + 2
∑
j 6=i
αij(Bi −Bj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xi
]
≥ 0. (12)
If Xi ≥ 0, then this inequality is satisfied when θ = θ(si, s−i) ≥ τ = θ(ti, s−i), that is, when
ti ≤ si as θ(·) is weakly increasing. Therefore, for every message mi, considering ti = minM−1i (mi)
guarantees that the incentive compatibility condition (10) is satisfied for every type si ∈Mi(mi) of
player i. Using the same reasoning, ti = maxM
−1
i (mi) guarantees the condition when Xi ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. As in the proof of Proposition 3 consider a disclosure strategy profile such
that every player completely certifies his type to all the other players whatever his type. Consider
a deviation by player i of type si from such a fully revealing disclosure strategy to a message profile
(mji )j 6=i, with m
j
i ∈ Mi(si) for j 6= i. To prevent such a deviation it suffices to show that we can
always find, for every player j 6= i, a worst-case type tji ∈M−1i (mji ) that now depends not only on
the identity of player i and the message mji , but also on the identity of player j, such that type si of
player i is better off when all players believe that player i’s type is si than when each player j 6= i
believes that it is commonly known that player i’s type is tji ∈M−1i (mji ) (and therefore player j will
play action a∗j (t
j
i , s−i) after message m
j
i from player i). There is a subtlety here in the belief system
off the equilibrium path that did not appear with public disclosure: we assume that player j, when
receiving message mji , believes that all players believe that i’s type is t
j
i . This is implied by belief
consistency under public communication (in which case we would have tji = t
k
i for j, k 6= i), but is
not required under private communication. The precise underlying assumption on beliefs is that,
when receiving message mji , player j believes that i’s type is t
j
i and player i has sent his equilibrium
message (i.e., has certified that his type is tji ) to all the other players (in particular, player j does
not necessarily believe that each other player k /∈ {i, j} has received the same message has him).
It can be checked that this belief system is still strongly consistent.22
The ex-post incentive compatible condition for player i can therefore be written as:
ui(a
∗
i (si, s−i), a
∗
−i(si, s−i); si, s−i) ≥ ui(BRi((a∗j (tji , s−i))j 6=i; si, s−i), (a∗j (tji , s−i))j 6=i; si, s−i).
To simplify the notations, let s = (si, s−i) and tj = (t
j
i , s−i). Using Equation (4) to replace player i’s
22The corresponding perturbed strategies could be such that each player i, whatever his type si, is infinitely more
likely to send one private message off the equilibrium path than to send more than one private message off the
equilibrium path.
21
utility when he plays a best response, the previous inequality can be rewritten as:
(a∗i (s))
2 −
∑
j 6=i
αij(a
∗
j (s))
2 ≥ (BRi((a∗j (tj))j 6=i; s)2 −
∑
j 6=i
αij(a
∗
j (t
j))2. (13)
Player i’s best response is given by Equation (3) and we use Equation (7) for the case of constant
bias to get:
BRi((a
∗
j (t
j))j 6=i; s) = αii(θ(s) + bi) +
∑
j 6=i
αija
∗
j (t
j) = αii(θ(s) + bi) +
∑
j 6=i
αij(θ(t
j) +Bj).
From the fact that Bi = αiibi +
∑
j 6=i αijBj , we get:
BRi((a
∗
j (t
j))j 6=i; s) = αiiθ(s) +
∑
j 6=i
αijθ(t
j) +Bi
We now insert this expression in Condition (13) and use the notations θ = θ(s) and τ j = θ(tj):
(θ +Bi)
2 −∑j 6=i αij(θ +Bj)2 ≥ (αiiθ +∑j 6=i αijτ j +Bi)2 −∑j 6=i αij(τ j +Bj)2
⇔
[
(θ − αiiθ −
∑
j 6=i αijτ
j)(θ + αiiθ +
∑
j 6=i αijτ
j + 2Bi)
]
−∑j 6=i αij [(θ − τ j)(θ + τ j + 2Bj)] ≥ 0
⇔
[∑
j 6=i αij(θ − τ j)((1 + αii)θ +
∑
k 6=i αikτ
k + 2Bi)
]
−∑j 6=i αij [(θ − τ j)(θ + τ j + 2Bj)] ≥ 0
⇔ ∑j 6=i αij [θ − τ j ][2(Bi −Bj) + αiiθ +∑k 6=i αikτk − τ j ] ≥ 0
⇔ ∑j 6=i αij [θ − τ j ][2(Bi −Bj) + (θ − τ j) +∑k 6=i αik(τk − θ)] ≥ 0
⇔ 2∑j 6=i αij(θ − τ j) (Bi −Bj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xij
+
∑
j 6=i
αij(θ − τ j)[(θ − τ j)−
∑
k 6=i
αik(θ − τk)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z
≥ 0 (14)
We have Z > 0 because Z can be rewritten as
∑
j 6=i αij(θ − τ j)2 − (
∑
j 6=i αij(θ − τ j))2. Hence,
using the monotonicity of θ(·), Condition (14) holds by letting tji = minM−1i (mji ) when Xij > 0
and tji = maxM
−1
i (m
j
i ) when Xij < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proofs are exactly the same as the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 except
that, along the equilibrium path, instead of fully certifying their types, players use the following
messages: (i) In the public disclosure game, each player i such that Xi < 0 sends, when his type
is si, a message mi ∈ Mi(si) such that si = maxM−1i (mi), and each player i such that Xi > 0
sends, when his type is si, a message mi ∈Mi(si) such that si = minM−1i (mi). (ii) In the private
disclosure game, each player i such that Xij ≤ 0 for all j ∈ N sends, when his type is si, a message
mji ∈Mi(si) such that si = minM−1i (mji ) to every other player j, each player i such that Xij ≥ 0
for all j ∈ N sends, when his type is si, a message mji ∈ Mi(si) such that si = minM−1i (mji ) to
every other player j, and the others completely certify their types.
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